The new state frontier between Sudan and South Sudan has thrown into relief the enormous problems that modern boundary-making can create. This article first sketches some of the recent consequences of the civil war and the new frontier for local peoples of the Blue Nile, many of whom have now sought refuge in South Sudan as an alternative to Ethiopia. It is then shown that political and social relations in the mountainous borderland between Sudan and Ethiopia have long been in creative flux. From antiquity, local peoples have played one side off against another, pursued trade while retaining some autonomy, and found allies and safe refuge when necessary. The modern state aims to impose clarity along its borders, but from the nineteenth century onwards, examples from this borderland show how destructive this can be. The lessons are now being learned afresh in the Blue Nile and adjacent areas of Upper Nile.
Introduction
This article focuses on the newest of Africa's states, South Sudan, and its international boundaries.
1 One of these is itself the newest in the whole continent, the boundary created by its secession from the former Sudan in 2011. However, many of the region's borders, including at least the eastern stretches of this one at the 'tri-junction point' where South Sudan meets both the present-day Republic of Sudan and Ethiopia, are heavy with history. The lines are sharp on the map, if not yet always on the ground; but in the past, the whole border zone of the escarpment, hills and valleys where the Sudanese plains meet the Ethiopian highlandsa stretch we can call the Blue Nile Borderlands -was a zone of comings and goings, mixing and matching, and a certain autonomy among many local communities. They were long used to taking advantage of the geographical opportunities of this sharply hilly landscape, making their own alliances and seeking their own security. Our present-day opposition of 'state' and 'non-state' actors, along with much of the terminology associated with the modern statestarting with the boundaries themselves -simply does not fit the way that borderlands used to 1 Editor's note: this paper is also due to be published later this year in work, and from the point of view of many local communities, perhaps still ought to work.
While current attention is being drawn to the politically difficult Sudanese borderland issues of today, 2 the social and cultural relevance of much older history is still worth exploring. This article offers a few perspectives from the long-term past on today's frontier zones with western Ethiopia.
The Blue Nile Borderlands (south): today
Spearheaded by the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), the second Sudanese civil war spread from the south into the northern provinces of Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile in the mid-1980s. These regions of fairly isolated hills are arguably very ancient places of refuge. There is one major difference between them, especially in the context of modern conflicts, in that the peoples of the Nuba Hills of Kordofan have not had the regular option of leaving the Sudanese state altogether for another country. But in the case of Blue Nile, it has repeatedly been possible to move eastwards into the hills, up the valleys, and into the Ethiopian state sphere.
It was in the course of 1987-89 that a substantial proportion of the rural population of the southernmost districts of Blue Nile province, including virtually all the Uduk speakers, did indeed leave their homes and seek refuge over the border in this way. An official UNHCR camp was set up at Tsore, near Assosa, in a locality already known to the Uduk as Langkwai, where their grandfathers used to go hunting (and where some memories even remained of seeking safety from raiding with the sheikhs of Beni Shangul in the 1890s). 3 Unfortunately this was only the first of a continuing series of enforced movements (see Map 1). The antiMengistu insurgency in Ethiopia itself meant the refugees had to leave this camp in early 1990 and to return to the (southern) Sudan, where they sought safety with the SPLA. By mid-1990 they were obliged to cross back into Ethiopia and spend nearly a year in the large camp at Itang, on the Baro. The fall of Mengistu in mid-1991 then meant they had to return to Sudan, along with hundreds of thousands of southern Sudanese, and to spend about a year in the Nasir area of Upper Nile province. The split in the SPLA later that year was a key factor in the Blue Nile refugees' subsequent spontaneous return -again -to Ethiopia, where a transit camp was set up for them at Karmi and by 1993 a new UNCHR camp at Bonga, well There were high hopes for peace in the Sudan at this time. But the provisio ns of the CPA for the three 'transitional areas' (Abyei, S. Kordofan and the new Blue Nile State) were not fully implemented. Specifically in the Blue Nile, the process of 'popular consultation' was largely carried out, but no conclusions formally arrived at or implemented. The expected peaceful demobilization of the SPLA forces indigenous to the region failed to take place.
Elections were indeed held in April 2010 according to plan, and the former commander Malik Agar, as they say these days a genuine 'son of the Blue Nile', was elected Governor of the State on the SPLM ticket. The result of the southern referendum in January 2011, however, soon began to look worrying for the people of Blue Nile. Serious violence broke out in S.
Kordofan even before the independence of South Sudan on 9 July 2011, and was followed by the same in Blue Nile from 1 September 2011. The new Blue Nile State then saw the start of aerial bombing by Khartoum on a scale never seen before, along with unprecedented ground attacks. Humanitarian access has been denied to international agencies. Following the formal recognition of the SPLM/A-North, the succession of paper agreements between various parties has not, at the time of writing, improved the security or even the plain survival chances for the people of Blue Nile. It is still very uncertain how the demilitarized buffer zone proposed as part of the September 2012 negotiations between Sudan and South Sudan would work on the ground or how far it will reassure displaced local communities along its route. Bruce does give some rich descriptions of the 'Shangalla' people, known by this blanket term long used of the linguistically diverse groups of the western lowlands, whom he clearly admired: 'Many nations of perfect blacks inhabit this low country, all Pagans, and mortal enemies to the Abyssinian government.' However, they were hunted by newly enthroned kings, the season being just before the rains, when the people were still living in the forests preparing their food for the approaching winter. At that point, 'the poor savage … retires into his caves in the mountain, where he passes that inclement season in constant confinement, but as constant security; for these nations are all Troglodytes….'
13 He expands a little further on:
the Shangalla retire 'with their respective foods, all dried in the sun, into caves dug in the heart of the mountains' these are not hard rocks like basalt or marble but 'of a soft, gritty, sandy stone, easily excavated and formed into different apartments … made generally in the steepest part of the mountain.'
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He gives a description of the system of the slave tributes demanded from neighbouring Shangalla groups by all local governments in the area -that is, highland chiefdoms subject to
Gondar. There are also passing references to the best gold country being among the 'Guba'
and 'Nuba' either side of the [Blue] Nile north of Fazuclo.
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Bruce claims that these lowlands were never seriously disputed between the sovereign powers of Abyssinia and Sennar; incursions would happen from time to time, and claims made over their people and their resources, including not only the predominantly hunting-andgathering Shangalla but also the cattle-herding peoples who also used the pastures and woodland of the escarpment and its outliers. pastoralists, could make working political agreements with local authorities on either side;
there was no need to declare total allegiance to one distant sovereign power or the other. The following account relates to the region corresponding broadly to that of today's Dinder National Park:
The Arabs, who fed their flocks near the frontiers of the two countries, were often plundered by the kings of Abyssinia making descents into Atbara; but this was never reckoned a violation of peace between the two sovereigns. On the contrary, as the motive of the Arabs, for coming south into the frontiers of Abyssinia, was to keep themselves independent, and out of the reach of Sennaar, when the king of Abyssinia fell upon them there, he was understood to do that monarch service, by driving them down farther within his reach. The Baharnagash [Viceroy of this region] 16 has always been at war with them; they are tributary to him for eating his grass and drinking his water, and nothing that he ever does to them gives any trouble or inquietude to Sennaar. It is interpreted as maintaining his ancient dominion over the Shepherds, those of Sennaar being a new power, and accounted as usurpers.
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Good relations of a locally agreed kind, and in this case crucial to trade, are also reported between the Agow of Damot (to the south of Gondar) and the neighbouring Shangalla (in this case almost certainly Gumuz). The goods exchanged include some of the same items, such as iron and cattle products on the one side and gold on the other that we know from Kosmas were already important more than a thousand years earlier:
Though the country of the Agows of Damot is generally plain and laid out in pasture, each tribe has some mountain to which, upon the alarm of an enemy, they retire with their flocks. The Galla, being their neighbours on the other side of the [Blue] Nile to the south, and the Shangalla in the low country immediately to the west, these natural fortresses are frequently of the greatest use during the incursions of both. They alone, of all the nations of Abyssinia, have found it their interest so far to cultivate their neighbours the Shangalla, that there are places set apart in which both nations can trade with each other in safety; where the Agows sell copper, iron, beads, skins, or hides, and receive an immense profit in gold; for, below these to the south and west, is the gold country nearest Abyssinia, none of that metal being found in Abyssinia itself. trade was important, neighbouring groups might set aside places of safety for it to take place.
Today, while both retreat for security reasons and the search for cross-border exchanges of all kinds still dominate the lives of borderland communities, local autonomy over these things has all but evaporated.
Bruce eventually left Gondar to cross the western lowlands himself on his way to Sennar and in due course home through Egypt. He set off in a NNW direction on 26 December 1771, refusing a royal escort and with just a few companions. Despite both actual and threatened attacks, the party eventually reached the last outpost of Ras el Fil, the final district under Abyssinian authority on their route. There was no established frontier; the capital of Atbara district of the Sennar kingdom, at Teawa, was still some distance ahead. And although there had been still poor diplomatic relations between the two kingdoms since an Ethiopian invasion of Sennar several decades earlier, Bruce noted the way in which these two frontier chiefs maintained, of their own local initiative, a balance in their social and political relations, and even divided up whatever taxes they could raise from the nomads between themselves.
Ras el Feel consisted once of thirty-nine villages. All the Arabs of Atbara resorted to them with butter, honey, horses, gold, and many other commodities; and the Shekh of Atbara, living upon the frontier of Sennaar, entertained a constant good correspondence with the Shekh of Ras el Feel, to whom he sent yearly a Dongola horse, two razors, and two dogs. The Shekh of Ras el Feel, in return, gave him a mule and a female slave; and the effect of this intercourse was to keep all the intermediate Arabs in their duty.
Since the expedition of Yasous II against Sennaar [in 1736] no peace has ever subsisted between the two states; on the contrary, all the Arabs that assisted the king, and were defeated with him, pay tribute no longer to Sennaar, but live on the frontiers of Abyssinia, and are protected there. The two chiefs of Atbara, and Ras el Feel, understand one another perfectly, and give the Arabs no trouble; and if they pay their rent to either, it is divided between both.
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Protection of marginal or displaced groups by more secure chiefdoms or kingdoms -such as the Abyssinian protection mentioned by Bruce above of some Sennar nomad Arabs who had supported them -was a recurring theme in the history of rural politics across our whole region. Even on the most local scale, it was central to Jean Buxton's innovative analysis of how the internal political structure of Mandari chiefdoms emerged from their ability to provide security, as she found the situation in the 1950s. 20 On a larger scale, Bruce's accounts of the immediate approach to Sennar and the city itself in his day reveal the importance of Nor were Jote's aggressive campaigns restricted to his Oromo neighbo urs. Schuver tells us that the plains to the west, below Kumbabi, were emptied -which had not been entirely The plain between Leqa and the lake is nearly desert and the Dinka tribes till the Sobat river have been so completely cut up by the inroads of the slave-traders, that they have been obliged to look to the Gallas for protection. There are in fact, in Leqa, something like 2000 Dinka slaves. 'Slaves' though their position is one of such, is scarcely the word, but I can use no other term. They are for the majority young men, who have fled to the Leqa country in order to escape death by starvation, their country having been destroyed by the 'Jellabs' and being still threatened by them in such a way that the formation of new settlements is out of the question.
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The five-day campaign against Sayo was a sorry effort. And, as Schuver had foreseen, it was not long before Jote's kingdom of western Wallagga was indeed invaded and annexed by Mahdist forces from the Sudan, in 1885. Jote briefly converted to Islam and retained his position, but then invited in the Shoan commander Ras Gobana, who was able to expel the Mahdists. 'King' Bula had lost his independence and spent the next phase of his career as dejazmach Jote Tullu, watching as his domains were progressively integrated into modern Ethiopia.
Gwynn's boundary, 1902: imperial peace?
Agreement on the actual line of the border across this region, where there was no simple separation between the peoples, the local chiefs, or the territory of Sudan on the one side and retrospective. 33 His relations with Abyssinian officials were always a little ambivalent. He was surprised to find that there were no Abyssinian posts of any size in Beni Shangul, where control was apparently in the hands of a few Sudan Arab families who had established themselves there under the old Egyptian government. He later realized that these were 'nothing more than slave raiders' from whom Menelik extracted tribute payable in gold, and while having to work with the existing agreement that the district be included in Ethiopia, he decided to include its outlying western hills in the Sudan, partly because their people 'appeared to stand in fear of their Beni Shangul neighbours'. Three years later, he discovered that one hill he had selected as a boundary marker because it was said to be waterless and 261-8. 37 The complicated history of the Baro salient is outlined in Faisal Abdel Rahman Ali Taha, 'The Problem of the Baro Salient ', Sudan Notes and Records 58 (1976): 21-30. tributary upstream, through the Anfillo forest to the high summit of Tullu Wallel near Gidami, and thence in a sharp north-westerly turn to the peak of Jebel Gemi, nicely positioned where the 9th parallel met the southerly end of Gwynn's border. 38 A purely hypothetical line of this kind, drawn through genuinely 'little known country' or perhaps a late 'no-man's land' from the point of view of the mapmakers, had even less chance than the agreement over Sudan's access to Gambela of surviving conflict between the colonial powers.
Snapshots from the Second World War
Gwynn's memoir of 1937 was written in the knowledge that the boundary lines with Ethiopia In command of assorted 'Anuak irregulars' in the Akobo region, south of the Sobat, he fought against Italian-led troops, which sometimes involved attacking villages where they were in occupation. In a graphic account published in the last year of his life, Evans-Pritchard notes that, fortunately for him, all Anuak could handle rifles, and they did not object to living on the country. The campaign depended on mobility and good intelligence. He had made a point of recruiting part of his band from the eastern regions of Anuak country, where there was some regard for the opinion of the Anuak king (whose domains had never been effectively governed from Addis Ababa and obviously had little sympathy for the Italians).
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In the 'post-imperial' era of Mengistu's dictatorship in Ethiopia, the Sudan-Ethiopian border became a frontier of the global Cold War. This itself prompted large numbers of local population movements, mostly by individuals and small groups seeking relative safety as civil conflict developed on both sides. Beyond this, however, the physical access provided by the Baro-Sobat valley as it opens out from the mountains into the Sudanese plains was transformed once again into an important economic and political corridor of opportunity, as Mengistu's regime supported the SPLA during the 1980s. The Ethiopians permitted SPLA bases and refugee camps for Sudanese -mainly southerners but also some from the then northern Sudan -to be established inside Ethiopia from the Kurmuk area down to the Gambela region and well south of the Baro river itself. The SPLA first moved north into the Blue Nile Province in 1984, and by 1985 they were passing through it regularly between bases in Ethiopia and in Upper Nile. Their programme (at the time) of democratic reform for the country as a whole found a response in the Blue Nile as in some other regions and communities of the 'north', and the SPLA was able to recruit. They advanced on Kurmuk and took the town in late 1987, retreating after a major struggle in which aircraft and international support summoned by Khartoum played a part.
The SPLA returned two years later, however, and retook the town briefly (eventually holding on to it after its third capture in 1997).
I can illustrate something of the contradictory and these days very dangerous ways in which such events draw in borderland peoples with a snapshot of the second battle for 
